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zoho.com

Receivers are told to reject mail that fails authentication for this domain.

Enforced

Receivers are told to reject mail that fails authentication for this domain. Keep watching aggregate reports so a new sending service does not silently start failing.

Score held up: DMARC is enforcing at p=reject, so nobody else can send as this domain. That is the hard part, and it is done. What is left below is about your own mail arriving, not about anyone spoofing you.

135 DNS queries · 454 ms

Fix these first
  1. 1
    Could not verify DKIM signing for Zoho Mail
    Confirm DKIM is switched on in Zoho Mail, then add your selector here so every future scan can verify it directly.
  2. 2
    CAA has no reporting address
    Add a record such as: 0 iodef "mailto:[email protected]"
  3. 3
    No MTA-STS policy
    Publish a TXT record at _mta-sts.zoho.com and a policy file at https://mta-sts.zoho.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

Identity ·Sending services detected

Read from your SPF includes and MX hosts, then checked for a published DKIM key.

Zoho MailSPF include:popspf.zohomail.com · SPF include:spf.zoho.com · SPF include:spf.zohomail.comno DKIM key at its selectors

Identity ·DMARC

v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; fo=0; rua=mailto:[email protected]; ruf=mailto:[email protected]
Policy
reject
Coverage
100%
Alignment
dkim=r spf=r

Identity ·DKIM

111 selectors probed

No key at the 111 selectors we tried. Selectors cannot be listed from DNS, so this is not proof DKIM is missing.

Identity ·SPF

Worst-case evaluation across every include.

v=spf1 include:spf.zoho.com include:zcsend.net include:spf.zohomail.com include:popspf.zohomail.com -all
DNS lookup budget4 / 10
  • include:spf.zoho.com
  • include:zcsend.net
  • include:spf.zohomail.com
  • include:popspf.zohomail.com

Findings (5)

MediumCould not verify DKIM signing for Zoho Mail›

Zoho Mail was detected via SPF include:popspf.zohomail.com, SPF include:spf.zoho.com, SPF include:spf.zohomail.com, so it is authorised to send mail as zoho.com. We checked the selectors it uses by default (zoho, zmail) and found no key. Zoho Mail lets you choose your own selector name, so this may simply mean yours is custom. If signing genuinely is not enabled, mail through this service will fail DMARC once forwarded.

What to do

Confirm DKIM is switched on in Zoho Mail, then add your selector here so every future scan can verify it directly.

RFC 6376

LowNo MTA-STS policy›

Without MTA-STS, mail to your domain can be downgraded to plaintext by an active network attacker, because SMTP's STARTTLS is opportunistic by default.

What to do

Publish a TXT record at _mta-sts.zoho.com and a policy file at https://mta-sts.zoho.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

RFC 8461

LowCAA has no reporting address›

You have restricted which authorities may issue certificates, but nobody is told when one refuses a request. An iodef address turns an attempted mis-issuance into an alert instead of a silent event.

What to do

Add a record such as: 0 iodef "mailto:[email protected]"

RFC 8659

InfoEligible for BIMI›

Your DMARC policy is already enforcing, which is the hard prerequisite for BIMI. Publishing a logo is now largely a branding exercise.

What to do

Publish an SVG Tiny PS logo plus a VMC, then add a default._bimi record.

InfoZone is not signed with DNSSEC›

This is the common case and not a misconfiguration -- most working mail domains are unsigned. It is worth knowing because your authentication records are only as trustworthy as the DNS answers carrying them, and because DNSSEC is the prerequisite for DANE.

What to do

If your DNS provider supports one-click DNSSEC, enabling it is low risk. If it does not, this is not worth changing providers over.

RFC 4033

Show 6 passing checks
PassAggregate reporting is configured›

Aggregate reports are requested at: [email protected].

PassDMARC policy is p=reject›

Mail failing authentication is rejected outright. This is the correct end state.

PassSPF lookup count is healthy (4/10)›

Worst-case evaluation stays within the limit with headroom to spare.

PassSPF ends in '-all' (hard fail)›

Unauthorised hosts are explicitly rejected. This is the correct end state.

PassTLS reporting is configured›

A TLS-RPT record at _smtp._tls.zoho.com asks sending servers that support TLS reporting to send reports on failed TLS connections to mailto:[email protected].

PassCertificate issuance is restricted by CAA›

Only digicert.com, letsencrypt.org, sectigo.com may issue certificates for this domain, so a certificate for your mail hosts or your MTA-STS policy endpoint from any other authority would be a mis-issuance.

RFC 8659

Transport and zone

Where your mail lands, and whether the DNS carrying your records can be trusted.

MXsmtpin3.zoho.com, smtpin2.zoho.com, smtpin.zoho.com
Reverse DNSforward-confirmed on every host
MTA-STSnot published
TLS-RPTconfigured
BIMInot published
DNSSECzone not signedCommon and not a misconfiguration.
CAAdigicert.com, letsencrypt.org, sectigo.com
DANEno TLSA records

This is the configuration. It is not the whole picture.

A DNS scan cannot tell you whether zoho.com’s mail actually aligns, because alignment is decided per message at the receiver. Collect DMARC aggregate reports to see every source sending as this domain.

zoho.com scores A for SPF, DKIM and DMARC · Signet