wipro.com
Receivers are told to send to spam mail that fails authentication for this domain.
Forged mail is being filtered to spam rather than rejected, or the policy applies to only a share of messages. Most of the protection is there; the last step is not.
Score held up: DMARC is enforcing at p=quarantine, so nobody else can send as this domain. That is the hard part, and it is done. What is left below is about your own mail arriving, not about anyone spoofing you.
134 DNS queries · 2926 ms
- 1Could not verify DKIM signing for Adobe MarketoConfirm DKIM is switched on in Adobe Marketo, then add your selector here so every future scan can verify it directly.
- 2Could not verify DKIM signing for Salesforce Marketing CloudConfirm DKIM is switched on in Salesforce Marketing Cloud, then add your selector here so every future scan can verify it directly.
- 3Could not verify DKIM signing for Salesforce PardotConfirm DKIM is switched on in Salesforce Pardot, then add your selector here so every future scan can verify it directly.
- 4SPF is close to the lookup limit (9/10)Trim unused senders now, before a provider's change pushes you over.
Identity ·Sending services detected
Read from your SPF includes and MX hosts, then checked for a published DKIM key.
Identity ·DMARC
- Policy
- quarantine
- Coverage
- 100%
- Alignment
- dkim=r spf=r
Identity ·DKIM
111 selectors probed
googleGoogle WorkspaceRSA 2048selector1Microsoft 365RSA 2048selector2Microsoft 365RSA 2048mte1Mailchimp TransactionalRSA 2048mte2Mailchimp TransactionalRSA 2048Identity ·SPF
Worst-case evaluation across every include.
- include:spf.protection.outlook.com
- include:et._spf.pardot.com
- include:_netblocks.google.com
- include:_netblocks2.google.com
- include:_netblocks3.google.com
- include:mktomail.com
- include:_spf.salesforce.com
- include:spf-eu.csodmail.com
Findings (11)
MediumDMARC policy is p=quarantine›
Failing mail is delivered to spam rather than rejected. A meaningful improvement over none, but spoofed mail still reaches the recipient's mailbox.
Move to p=reject once reports show no legitimate mail failing.
MediumSPF is close to the lookup limit (9/10)›
You have little headroom. Providers change their own include trees without notice, so a record at 8 or 9 lookups can break without you touching it.
Trim unused senders now, before a provider's change pushes you over.
RFC 7208 s4.6.4
MediumCould not verify DKIM signing for Adobe Marketo›
Adobe Marketo was detected via SPF include:mktomail.com, so it is authorised to send mail as wipro.com. We checked the selectors it uses by default (m1, mktomail) and found no key. Adobe Marketo lets you choose your own selector name, so this may simply mean yours is custom. If signing genuinely is not enabled, mail through this service will fail DMARC once forwarded.
Confirm DKIM is switched on in Adobe Marketo, then add your selector here so every future scan can verify it directly.
RFC 6376
MediumCould not verify DKIM signing for Salesforce Marketing Cloud›
Salesforce Marketing Cloud was detected via SPF include:_spf.salesforce.com, so it is authorised to send mail as wipro.com. We checked the selectors it uses by default (sfmc1, sfmc2, exacttarget) and found no key. Salesforce Marketing Cloud lets you choose your own selector name, so this may simply mean yours is custom. If signing genuinely is not enabled, mail through this service will fail DMARC once forwarded.
Confirm DKIM is switched on in Salesforce Marketing Cloud, then add your selector here so every future scan can verify it directly.
RFC 6376
MediumCould not verify DKIM signing for Salesforce Pardot›
Salesforce Pardot was detected via SPF include:et._spf.pardot.com, so it is authorised to send mail as wipro.com. We checked the selectors it uses by default (pardot) and found no key. Salesforce Pardot lets you choose your own selector name, so this may simply mean yours is custom. If signing genuinely is not enabled, mail through this service will fail DMARC once forwarded.
Confirm DKIM is switched on in Salesforce Pardot, then add your selector here so every future scan can verify it directly.
RFC 6376
LowNo explicit subdomain policy (sp=)›
Subdomains inherit p=, which is usually what you want. Setting 'sp=reject' explicitly protects unused subdomains even while the parent is still at p=none.
Consider adding 'sp=reject' if no subdomain sends mail.
LowNo MTA-STS policy›
Without MTA-STS, mail to your domain can be downgraded to plaintext by an active network attacker, because SMTP's STARTTLS is opportunistic by default.
Publish a TXT record at _mta-sts.wipro.com and a policy file at https://mta-sts.wipro.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.
RFC 8461
LowNo TLS-RPT record›
Sending servers have no address to report TLS failures on mail to your domain, so transport problems stay invisible to you until someone complains.
Publish 'v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:<address>' at _smtp._tls.wipro.com.
RFC 8460
LowNo CAA record›
Any certificate authority in the world may issue a certificate for this domain. A mis-issued certificate can be used to intercept mail on the wire and to impersonate your domain over HTTPS.
Publish a CAA record naming your certificate authority, for example: 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
InfoEligible for BIMI›
Your DMARC policy is already enforcing, which is the hard prerequisite for BIMI. Publishing a logo is now largely a branding exercise.
Publish an SVG Tiny PS logo plus a VMC, then add a default._bimi record.
InfoEligible for DANE›
Your zone is signed, which is the hard prerequisite for DANE. Publishing TLSA records for your MX hosts would let sending servers pin your certificates without relying on the public CA system.
Publish a TLSA record at _25._tcp.<each MX host> matching your MX certificate.
RFC 7672
Show 11 passing checks
PassAggregate reporting is configured›
Aggregate reports are requested at: [email protected].
PassSPF ends in '-all' (hard fail)›
Unauthorised hosts are explicitly rejected. This is the correct end state.
PassGoogle Workspace's DKIM key is published at google._domainkey›
Detected via SPF include:_netblocks.google.com, SPF include:_netblocks2.google.com, SPF include:_netblocks3.google.com. A valid public key for this service is published at google._domainkey.wipro.com.
PassMicrosoft 365's DKIM keys are published at selector1._domainkey, selector2._domainkey›
Detected via SPF include:spf.protection.outlook.com, MX wipro-com.mail.protection.outlook.com. A valid public key for this service is published at selector1._domainkey.wipro.com, selector2._domainkey.wipro.com.
Pass5 DKIM key(s) published›
Found at: google, mte1, mte2, selector1, selector2.
PassSelector 'google' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 'selector1' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 'selector2' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 'mte1' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 'mte2' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassZone is signed and validates›
A validating resolver reported this zone's answers as authenticated. Resolvers that validate DNSSEC reject a tampered answer for your SPF, DKIM and DMARC records rather than pass it on. This also makes DANE available to you.
Transport and zone
Where your mail lands, and whether the DNS carrying your records can be trusted.
This is the configuration. It is not the whole picture.
A DNS scan cannot tell you whether wipro.com’s mail actually aligns, because alignment is decided per message at the receiver. Collect DMARC aggregate reports to see every source sending as this domain.