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stripe.com

Receivers are told to reject mail that fails authentication for this domain.

Enforced

Receivers are told to reject mail that fails authentication for this domain. Keep watching aggregate reports so a new sending service does not silently start failing.

Score held up: DMARC is enforcing at p=reject, so nobody else can send as this domain. That is the hard part, and it is done. What is left below is about your own mail arriving, not about anyone spoofing you.

158 DNS queries · 340 ms

Fix these first
  1. 1
    Selector 'google' uses a 1024-bit RSA key
    Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
  2. 2
    Selector 'qualtrics' uses a 1024-bit RSA key
    Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
  3. 3
    Selector 'mandrill' uses a 1024-bit RSA key
    Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
  4. 4
    Selector 's1' uses a 1024-bit RSA key
    Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.

Identity ·Sending services detected

Read from your SPF includes and MX hosts, then checked for a published DKIM key.

Amazon SESSPF include:amazonses.com (nested)
Google WorkspaceSPF include:_spf.google.com (nested) · MX alt1.aspmx.l.google.com · MX alt2.aspmx.l.google.com · MX aspmx.l.google.com · MX aspmx2.googlemail.com · MX aspmx3.googlemail.comkey published · google
QualtricsSPF include:_spf.qualtrics.comkey published · qualtrics
ZendeskSPF include:mail.zendesk.com (nested)key published · zendesk1, zendesk2

Identity ·DMARC

v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; fo=1; rua=mailto:[email protected]; ruf=mailto:[email protected];
Policy
reject
Coverage
100%
Alignment
dkim=r spf=r

Identity ·DKIM

111 selectors probed

googleGoogle WorkspaceRSA 1024
qualtricsQualtricsRSA 1024
zendesk1ZendeskRSA 2048
zendesk2ZendeskRSA 2048
mandrillMailchimp TransactionalRSA 1024
s1SendGridRSA 1024
s2SendGridRSA 1024
mgMailgunRSA 1024
intercomIntercomRSA 1024
m1MarketoRSA 1024

Identity ·SPF

Worst-case evaluation across every include.

v=spf1 ip4:198.2.180.60/32 ip4:13.111.2.227/32 include:spf1.stripe.com include:greenhouse-outbound-mail.stripe.com include:_spf.qualtrics.com ~all
DNS lookup budget7 / 10
  • include:spf1.stripe.com
  • include:_spf.google.com
  • include:amazonses.com
  • include:mail.zendesk.com
  • include:greenhouse-outbound-mail.stripe.com
  • include:greenhouse-outbound-mail-old.stripe.com
  • include:_spf.qualtrics.com

Findings (14)

MediumSelector 'google' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›

1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.

What to do

Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.

RFC 8301

MediumSelector 'qualtrics' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›

1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.

What to do

Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.

RFC 8301

MediumSelector 'mandrill' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›

1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.

What to do

Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.

RFC 8301

MediumSelector 's1' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›

1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.

What to do

Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.

RFC 8301

MediumSelector 's2' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›

1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.

What to do

Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.

RFC 8301

MediumSelector 'mg' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›

1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.

What to do

Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.

RFC 8301

MediumSelector 'intercom' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›

1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.

What to do

Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.

RFC 8301

MediumSelector 'm1' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›

1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.

What to do

Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.

RFC 8301

LowNo explicit subdomain policy (sp=)›

Subdomains inherit p=, which is usually what you want. Setting 'sp=reject' explicitly protects unused subdomains even while the parent is still at p=none.

What to do

Consider adding 'sp=reject' if no subdomain sends mail.

LowSPF ends in '~all' (softfail)›

Softfail is the correct setting while you are still discovering senders, but it asks receivers to accept unauthorised mail and merely note it.

What to do

Once your aggregate reports show no unexplained legitimate sources, tighten to '-all'.

LowNo MTA-STS policy›

Without MTA-STS, mail to your domain can be downgraded to plaintext by an active network attacker, because SMTP's STARTTLS is opportunistic by default.

What to do

Publish a TXT record at _mta-sts.stripe.com and a policy file at https://mta-sts.stripe.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

RFC 8461

LowNo TLS-RPT record›

Sending servers have no address to report TLS failures on mail to your domain, so transport problems stay invisible to you until someone complains.

What to do

Publish 'v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:<address>' at _smtp._tls.stripe.com.

RFC 8460

InfoEligible for BIMI›

Your DMARC policy is already enforcing, which is the hard prerequisite for BIMI. Publishing a logo is now largely a branding exercise.

What to do

Publish an SVG Tiny PS logo plus a VMC, then add a default._bimi record.

InfoZone is not signed with DNSSEC›

This is the common case and not a misconfiguration -- most working mail domains are unsigned. It is worth knowing because your authentication records are only as trustworthy as the DNS answers carrying them, and because DNSSEC is the prerequisite for DANE.

What to do

If your DNS provider supports one-click DNSSEC, enabling it is low risk. If it does not, this is not worth changing providers over.

RFC 4033

Show 10 passing checks
PassAggregate reporting is configured›

Aggregate reports are requested at: [email protected].

PassDMARC policy is p=reject›

Mail failing authentication is rejected outright. This is the correct end state.

PassSPF lookup count is healthy (7/10)›

Worst-case evaluation stays within the limit with headroom to spare.

PassGoogle Workspace's DKIM key is published at google._domainkey›

Detected via SPF include:_spf.google.com (nested), MX alt1.aspmx.l.google.com, MX alt2.aspmx.l.google.com, MX aspmx.l.google.com, MX aspmx2.googlemail.com, MX aspmx3.googlemail.com. A valid public key for this service is published at google._domainkey.stripe.com.

PassQualtrics's DKIM key is published at qualtrics._domainkey›

Detected via SPF include:_spf.qualtrics.com. A valid public key for this service is published at qualtrics._domainkey.stripe.com.

PassZendesk's DKIM keys are published at zendesk1._domainkey, zendesk2._domainkey›

Detected via SPF include:mail.zendesk.com (nested). A valid public key for this service is published at zendesk1._domainkey.stripe.com, zendesk2._domainkey.stripe.com.

Pass10 DKIM key(s) published›

Found at: google, intercom, m1, mandrill, mg, qualtrics, s1, s2, zendesk1, zendesk2.

PassSelector 'zendesk1' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›

Key length meets current guidance.

PassSelector 'zendesk2' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›

Key length meets current guidance.

PassCertificate issuance is restricted by CAA›

Only amazon.com, digicert.com, visa.com may issue certificates for this domain, so a certificate for your mail hosts or your MTA-STS policy endpoint from any other authority would be a mis-issuance.

RFC 8659

Transport and zone

Where your mail lands, and whether the DNS carrying your records can be trusted.

MXaspmx.l.google.com, alt1.aspmx.l.google.com, alt2.aspmx.l.google.com, aspmx2.googlemail.com, aspmx3.googlemail.com
Reverse DNSforward-confirmed on every host
MTA-STSnot published
TLS-RPTnot published
BIMInot published
DNSSECzone not signedCommon and not a misconfiguration.
CAAamazon.com, digicert.com, visa.com
DANEno TLSA records

This is the configuration. It is not the whole picture.

A DNS scan cannot tell you whether stripe.com’s mail actually aligns, because alignment is decided per message at the receiver. Collect DMARC aggregate reports to see every source sending as this domain.

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stripe.com scores A for SPF, DKIM and DMARC · Signet