okta.com
Receivers are told to reject mail that fails authentication for this domain.
Receivers are told to reject mail that fails authentication for this domain. Keep watching aggregate reports so a new sending service does not silently start failing.
Score held up: DMARC is enforcing at p=reject, so nobody else can send as this domain. That is the hard part, and it is done. What is left below is about your own mail arriving, not about anyone spoofing you.
132 DNS queries · 2038 ms
- 1Selector 's2' uses a 1024-bit RSA keyRotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
- 2Selector 'smtpapi' uses a 1024-bit RSA keyRotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
- 3Selector 'qualtrics' uses a 1024-bit RSA keyRotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
- 4Selector 'm1' uses a 1024-bit RSA keyRotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
Identity ·Sending services detected
Read from your SPF includes and MX hosts, then checked for a published DKIM key.
Identity ·DMARC
- Policy
- reject
- Coverage
- 100%
- Alignment
- dkim=r spf=r
Identity ·DKIM
111 selectors probed
k2MailchimpRSA 2048k3MailchimpRSA 2048s1SendGridRSA 2048s2SendGridRSA 1024smtpapiSendGridRSA 1024zendesk1ZendeskRSA 2048zendesk2ZendeskRSA 2048qualtricsQualtricsRSA 1024m1MarketoRSA 1024Identity ·SPF
Worst-case evaluation across every include.
Findings (9)
MediumSelector 's2' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›
1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.
Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
RFC 8301
MediumSelector 'smtpapi' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›
1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.
Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
RFC 8301
MediumSelector 'qualtrics' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›
1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.
Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
RFC 8301
MediumSelector 'm1' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›
1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.
Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
RFC 8301
LowNo explicit subdomain policy (sp=)›
Subdomains inherit p=, which is usually what you want. Setting 'sp=reject' explicitly protects unused subdomains even while the parent is still at p=none.
Consider adding 'sp=reject' if no subdomain sends mail.
LowNo MTA-STS policy›
Without MTA-STS, mail to your domain can be downgraded to plaintext by an active network attacker, because SMTP's STARTTLS is opportunistic by default.
Publish a TXT record at _mta-sts.okta.com and a policy file at https://mta-sts.okta.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.
RFC 8461
LowNo TLS-RPT record›
Sending servers have no address to report TLS failures on mail to your domain, so transport problems stay invisible to you until someone complains.
Publish 'v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:<address>' at _smtp._tls.okta.com.
RFC 8460
LowBIMI has no Verified Mark Certificate›
Gmail requires a VMC (the a= tag) before it will display a BIMI logo. Without one, only a handful of receivers will show it.
Obtain a VMC from an authorised issuer and add it as the a= tag.
InfoZone is not signed with DNSSEC›
This is the common case and not a misconfiguration -- most working mail domains are unsigned. It is worth knowing because your authentication records are only as trustworthy as the DNS answers carrying them, and because DNSSEC is the prerequisite for DANE.
If your DNS provider supports one-click DNSSEC, enabling it is low risk. If it does not, this is not worth changing providers over.
RFC 4033
Show 13 passing checks
PassAggregate reporting is configured›
Aggregate reports are requested at: [email protected], [email protected].
PassExternal report destination emaildefense.proofpoint.com is correctly authorised›
Authorised by okta.com._report._dmarc.emaildefense.proofpoint.com
PassExternal report destination emaildefense.proofpoint.com is correctly authorised›
Authorised by okta.com._report._dmarc.emaildefense.proofpoint.com
PassDMARC policy is p=reject›
Mail failing authentication is rejected outright. This is the correct end state.
PassSPF lookup count is healthy (1/10)›
Worst-case evaluation stays within the limit with headroom to spare.
PassSPF ends in '-all' (hard fail)›
Unauthorised hosts are explicitly rejected. This is the correct end state.
Pass9 DKIM key(s) published›
Found at: k2, k3, m1, qualtrics, s1, s2, smtpapi, zendesk1, zendesk2.
PassSelector 'k2' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 'k3' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 's1' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 'zendesk1' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 'zendesk2' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassCertificate issuance is restricted by CAA›
Only amazonaws.com, digicert.com, globalsign.com, letsencrypt.org, pki.goog may issue certificates for this domain, so a certificate for your mail hosts or your MTA-STS policy endpoint from any other authority would be a mis-issuance. Wildcard certificates are limited separately, to digicert.com, globalsign.com.
RFC 8659
Transport and zone
Where your mail lands, and whether the DNS carrying your records can be trusted.
This is the configuration. It is not the whole picture.
A DNS scan cannot tell you whether okta.com’s mail actually aligns, because alignment is decided per message at the receiver. Collect DMARC aggregate reports to see every source sending as this domain.