linkedin.com
Receivers are told to reject mail that fails authentication for this domain.
Receivers are told to reject mail that fails authentication for this domain. Keep watching aggregate reports so a new sending service does not silently start failing.
Score held up: DMARC is enforcing at p=reject, so nobody else can send as this domain. That is the hard part, and it is done. What is left below is about your own mail arriving, not about anyone spoofing you.
143 DNS queries · 3085 ms
- 1Selector 'google' uses a 1024-bit RSA keyRotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
- 2No CAA recordPublish a CAA record naming your certificate authority, for example: 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
- 3Selector 'dk' is revokedDelete the record once no mail in flight still references it.
- 4No explicit subdomain policy (sp=)Consider adding 'sp=reject' if no subdomain sends mail.
Identity ·DMARC
- Policy
- reject
- Coverage
- 100%
- Alignment
- dkim=r spf=r
Identity ·DKIM
111 selectors probed
googleGoogle WorkspaceRSA 1024dkGeneric (DomainKeys legacy)revokedIdentity ·SPF
Worst-case evaluation across every include.
Findings (7)
MediumSelector 'google' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›
1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.
Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
RFC 8301
LowNo explicit subdomain policy (sp=)›
Subdomains inherit p=, which is usually what you want. Setting 'sp=reject' explicitly protects unused subdomains even while the parent is still at p=none.
Consider adding 'sp=reject' if no subdomain sends mail.
LowSPF ends in '~all' (softfail)›
Softfail is the correct setting while you are still discovering senders, but it asks receivers to accept unauthorised mail and merely note it.
Once your aggregate reports show no unexplained legitimate sources, tighten to '-all'.
LowSelector 'dk' is revoked›
The record has an empty p= tag, which RFC 6376 defines as revocation. Harmless if intentional, but stale revoked selectors are worth cleaning up.
Delete the record once no mail in flight still references it.
LowNo MTA-STS policy›
Without MTA-STS, mail to your domain can be downgraded to plaintext by an active network attacker, because SMTP's STARTTLS is opportunistic by default.
Publish a TXT record at _mta-sts.linkedin.com and a policy file at https://mta-sts.linkedin.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.
RFC 8461
LowNo CAA record›
Any certificate authority in the world may issue a certificate for this domain. A mis-issued certificate can be used to intercept mail on the wire and to impersonate your domain over HTTPS.
Publish a CAA record naming your certificate authority, for example: 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
InfoZone is not signed with DNSSEC›
This is the common case and not a misconfiguration -- most working mail domains are unsigned. It is worth knowing because your authentication records are only as trustworthy as the DNS answers carrying them, and because DNSSEC is the prerequisite for DANE.
If your DNS provider supports one-click DNSSEC, enabling it is low risk. If it does not, this is not worth changing providers over.
RFC 4033
Show 9 passing checks
PassAggregate reporting is configured›
Aggregate reports are requested at: [email protected], [email protected].
PassExternal report destination rua.agari.com is correctly authorised›
Authorised by linkedin.com._report._dmarc.rua.agari.com
PassExternal report destination rua.dmarc.emailanalyst.com is correctly authorised›
Authorised by linkedin.com._report._dmarc.rua.dmarc.emailanalyst.com
PassExternal report destination ruf.agari.com is correctly authorised›
Authorised by linkedin.com._report._dmarc.ruf.agari.com
PassDMARC policy is p=reject›
Mail failing authentication is rejected outright. This is the correct end state.
PassSPF lookup count is healthy (2/10)›
Worst-case evaluation stays within the limit with headroom to spare.
Pass1 DKIM key(s) published›
Found at: google.
PassTLS reporting is configured›
A TLS-RPT record at _smtp._tls.linkedin.com asks sending servers that support TLS reporting to send reports on failed TLS connections to mailto:[email protected].
PassBIMI is published with a certificate reference›
The record at default._bimi.linkedin.com names a logo and a Verified Mark Certificate (a=), and DMARC is enforcing, which BIMI requires. We read the record only; the logo and certificate themselves were not fetched or checked.
Transport and zone
Where your mail lands, and whether the DNS carrying your records can be trusted.
This is the configuration. It is not the whole picture.
A DNS scan cannot tell you whether linkedin.com’s mail actually aligns, because alignment is decided per message at the receiver. Collect DMARC aggregate reports to see every source sending as this domain.