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Signet

intuit.com

Receivers are told to reject mail that fails authentication for this domain.

Enforced

Receivers are told to reject mail that fails authentication for this domain. Keep watching aggregate reports so a new sending service does not silently start failing.

Score held up: DMARC is enforcing at p=reject, so nobody else can send as this domain. That is the hard part, and it is done. What is left below is about your own mail arriving, not about anyone spoofing you.

145 DNS queries · 1650 ms

Fix these first
  1. 1
    Could not verify DKIM signing for Salesforce Marketing Cloud
    Confirm DKIM is switched on in Salesforce Marketing Cloud, then add your selector here so every future scan can verify it directly.
  2. 2
    Selector 'm1' uses a 1024-bit RSA key
    Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
  3. 3
    Selector 'k1' uses a 1024-bit RSA key
    Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
  4. 4
    Selector 'mandrill' uses a 1024-bit RSA key
    Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.

Identity ·Sending services detected

Read from your SPF includes and MX hosts, then checked for a published DKIM key.

Adobe MarketoSPF include:mktomail.comkey published · m1
Cisco Secure EmailMX mx1.intuit.iphmx.com · MX mx2.intuit.iphmx.com
Microsoft 365SPF include:spf.protection.outlook.com (nested)
Salesforce Marketing CloudSPF include:_spf.salesforce.comno DKIM key at its selectors
ZendeskSPF include:mail.zendesk.com (nested)key published · zendesk1, zendesk2

Identity ·DMARC

v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:[email protected]; ruf=mailto:[email protected];fo=1
Policy
reject
Coverage
100%
Alignment
dkim=r spf=r

Identity ·DKIM

111 selectors probed

m1MarketoRSA 1024
zendesk1ZendeskRSA 2048
zendesk2ZendeskRSA 2048
googleGoogle WorkspaceRSA 2048
k1Mailchimp / MailgunRSA 1024
k2MailchimpRSA 2048
k3MailchimpRSA 2048
mandrillMailchimp TransactionalRSA 1024
mte1Mailchimp TransactionalRSA 2048
mte2Mailchimp TransactionalRSA 2048
s1SendGridRSA 2048
s2SendGridRSA 1024
smtpapiSendGridRSA 1024
defaultDefault (OpenDKIM / cPanel / Plesk)RSA 1024
mailGenericRSA 1024
emailGenericRSA 2048
s3GenericRSA 2048

Identity ·SPF

Worst-case evaluation across every include.

v=spf1 include:_spf1.intuit.com include:_spf3.intuit.com include:mktomail.com include:_spf.salesforce.com include:_spf.centercode.com ip4:208.74.204.0/22 ip4:69.20.83.154 ip4:166.78.224.177 ip4:96.43.144.65/28 ip4:96.43.148.65/28 ip4:96.43.151.70/28 -all
DNS lookup budget10 / 10
  • include:_spf1.intuit.com
  • include:spf.protection.outlook.com
  • include:_spf2.intuit.com
  • include:stspg-customer.com
  • include:mail.zendesk.com
  • include:_spf3.intuit.com
  • include:mktomail.com
  • include:_spf.salesforce.com
  • include:_spf.centercode.com

Findings (14)

MediumSPF uses exactly the full lookup budget (10/10)›

The record is legal but has zero headroom. If any provider in your include tree adds a single lookup on their side, your SPF silently starts returning permerror and stops authorising your mail.

What to do

Reclaim headroom now by removing unused includes or replacing one with the ip4/ip6 ranges it resolves to.

RFC 7208 s4.6.4

MediumCould not verify DKIM signing for Salesforce Marketing Cloud›

Salesforce Marketing Cloud was detected via SPF include:_spf.salesforce.com, so it is authorised to send mail as intuit.com. We checked the selectors it uses by default (sfmc1, sfmc2, exacttarget) and found no key. Salesforce Marketing Cloud lets you choose your own selector name, so this may simply mean yours is custom. If signing genuinely is not enabled, mail through this service will fail DMARC once forwarded.

What to do

Confirm DKIM is switched on in Salesforce Marketing Cloud, then add your selector here so every future scan can verify it directly.

RFC 6376

MediumSelector 'm1' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›

1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.

What to do

Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.

RFC 8301

MediumSelector 'k1' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›

1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.

What to do

Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.

RFC 8301

MediumSelector 'mandrill' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›

1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.

What to do

Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.

RFC 8301

MediumSelector 's2' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›

1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.

What to do

Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.

RFC 8301

MediumSelector 'smtpapi' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›

1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.

What to do

Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.

RFC 8301

MediumSelector 'default' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›

1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.

What to do

Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.

RFC 8301

MediumSelector 'mail' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›

1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.

What to do

Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.

RFC 8301

LowNo explicit subdomain policy (sp=)›

Subdomains inherit p=, which is usually what you want. Setting 'sp=reject' explicitly protects unused subdomains even while the parent is still at p=none.

What to do

Consider adding 'sp=reject' if no subdomain sends mail.

LowNo MTA-STS policy›

Without MTA-STS, mail to your domain can be downgraded to plaintext by an active network attacker, because SMTP's STARTTLS is opportunistic by default.

What to do

Publish a TXT record at _mta-sts.intuit.com and a policy file at https://mta-sts.intuit.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

RFC 8461

LowNo TLS-RPT record›

Sending servers have no address to report TLS failures on mail to your domain, so transport problems stay invisible to you until someone complains.

What to do

Publish 'v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:<address>' at _smtp._tls.intuit.com.

RFC 8460

InfoEligible for BIMI›

Your DMARC policy is already enforcing, which is the hard prerequisite for BIMI. Publishing a logo is now largely a branding exercise.

What to do

Publish an SVG Tiny PS logo plus a VMC, then add a default._bimi record.

InfoZone is not signed with DNSSEC›

This is the common case and not a misconfiguration -- most working mail domains are unsigned. It is worth knowing because your authentication records are only as trustworthy as the DNS answers carrying them, and because DNSSEC is the prerequisite for DANE.

What to do

If your DNS provider supports one-click DNSSEC, enabling it is low risk. If it does not, this is not worth changing providers over.

RFC 4033

Show 19 passing checks
PassAggregate reporting is configured›

Aggregate reports are requested at: [email protected].

PassExternal report destination emaildefense.proofpoint.com is correctly authorised›

Authorised by intuit.com._report._dmarc.emaildefense.proofpoint.com

PassExternal report destination emaildefense.proofpoint.com is correctly authorised›

Authorised by intuit.com._report._dmarc.emaildefense.proofpoint.com

PassDMARC policy is p=reject›

Mail failing authentication is rejected outright. This is the correct end state.

PassSPF ends in '-all' (hard fail)›

Unauthorised hosts are explicitly rejected. This is the correct end state.

PassAdobe Marketo's DKIM key is published at m1._domainkey›

Detected via SPF include:mktomail.com. A valid public key for this service is published at m1._domainkey.intuit.com.

PassZendesk's DKIM keys are published at zendesk1._domainkey, zendesk2._domainkey›

Detected via SPF include:mail.zendesk.com (nested). A valid public key for this service is published at zendesk1._domainkey.intuit.com, zendesk2._domainkey.intuit.com.

Pass17 DKIM key(s) published›

Found at: default, email, google, k1, k2, k3, m1, mail, mandrill, mte1, mte2, s1, s2, s3, smtpapi, zendesk1, zendesk2.

PassSelector 'zendesk1' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›

Key length meets current guidance.

PassSelector 'zendesk2' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›

Key length meets current guidance.

PassSelector 'google' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›

Key length meets current guidance.

PassSelector 'k2' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›

Key length meets current guidance.

PassSelector 'k3' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›

Key length meets current guidance.

PassSelector 'mte1' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›

Key length meets current guidance.

PassSelector 'mte2' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›

Key length meets current guidance.

PassSelector 's1' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›

Key length meets current guidance.

PassSelector 'email' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›

Key length meets current guidance.

PassSelector 's3' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›

Key length meets current guidance.

PassCertificate issuance is restricted by CAA›

Only amazon.com, comodoca.com, digicert.com, globalsign.com, letsencrypt.org, pki.goog, sectigo.com may issue certificates for this domain, so a certificate for your mail hosts or your MTA-STS policy endpoint from any other authority would be a mis-issuance.

RFC 8659

Transport and zone

Where your mail lands, and whether the DNS carrying your records can be trusted.

MXmx1.intuit.iphmx.com, mx2.intuit.iphmx.com
Reverse DNSforward-confirmed on every host
MTA-STSnot published
TLS-RPTnot published
BIMInot published
DNSSECzone not signedCommon and not a misconfiguration.
CAAamazon.com, pki.goog, comodoca.com, letsencrypt.org, sectigo.com, digicert.com, globalsign.com
DANEno TLSA records

This is the configuration. It is not the whole picture.

A DNS scan cannot tell you whether intuit.com’s mail actually aligns, because alignment is decided per message at the receiver. Collect DMARC aggregate reports to see every source sending as this domain.

intuit.com scores A for SPF, DKIM and DMARC · Signet