intuit.com
Receivers are told to reject mail that fails authentication for this domain.
Receivers are told to reject mail that fails authentication for this domain. Keep watching aggregate reports so a new sending service does not silently start failing.
Score held up: DMARC is enforcing at p=reject, so nobody else can send as this domain. That is the hard part, and it is done. What is left below is about your own mail arriving, not about anyone spoofing you.
145 DNS queries · 1650 ms
- 1Could not verify DKIM signing for Salesforce Marketing CloudConfirm DKIM is switched on in Salesforce Marketing Cloud, then add your selector here so every future scan can verify it directly.
- 2Selector 'm1' uses a 1024-bit RSA keyRotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
- 3Selector 'k1' uses a 1024-bit RSA keyRotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
- 4Selector 'mandrill' uses a 1024-bit RSA keyRotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
Identity ·Sending services detected
Read from your SPF includes and MX hosts, then checked for a published DKIM key.
Identity ·DMARC
- Policy
- reject
- Coverage
- 100%
- Alignment
- dkim=r spf=r
Identity ·DKIM
111 selectors probed
m1MarketoRSA 1024zendesk1ZendeskRSA 2048zendesk2ZendeskRSA 2048googleGoogle WorkspaceRSA 2048k1Mailchimp / MailgunRSA 1024k2MailchimpRSA 2048k3MailchimpRSA 2048mandrillMailchimp TransactionalRSA 1024mte1Mailchimp TransactionalRSA 2048mte2Mailchimp TransactionalRSA 2048s1SendGridRSA 2048s2SendGridRSA 1024smtpapiSendGridRSA 1024defaultDefault (OpenDKIM / cPanel / Plesk)RSA 1024mailGenericRSA 1024emailGenericRSA 2048s3GenericRSA 2048Identity ·SPF
Worst-case evaluation across every include.
- include:_spf1.intuit.com
- include:spf.protection.outlook.com
- include:_spf2.intuit.com
- include:stspg-customer.com
- include:mail.zendesk.com
- include:_spf3.intuit.com
- include:mktomail.com
- include:_spf.salesforce.com
- include:_spf.centercode.com
Findings (14)
MediumSPF uses exactly the full lookup budget (10/10)›
The record is legal but has zero headroom. If any provider in your include tree adds a single lookup on their side, your SPF silently starts returning permerror and stops authorising your mail.
Reclaim headroom now by removing unused includes or replacing one with the ip4/ip6 ranges it resolves to.
RFC 7208 s4.6.4
MediumCould not verify DKIM signing for Salesforce Marketing Cloud›
Salesforce Marketing Cloud was detected via SPF include:_spf.salesforce.com, so it is authorised to send mail as intuit.com. We checked the selectors it uses by default (sfmc1, sfmc2, exacttarget) and found no key. Salesforce Marketing Cloud lets you choose your own selector name, so this may simply mean yours is custom. If signing genuinely is not enabled, mail through this service will fail DMARC once forwarded.
Confirm DKIM is switched on in Salesforce Marketing Cloud, then add your selector here so every future scan can verify it directly.
RFC 6376
MediumSelector 'm1' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›
1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.
Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
RFC 8301
MediumSelector 'k1' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›
1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.
Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
RFC 8301
MediumSelector 'mandrill' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›
1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.
Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
RFC 8301
MediumSelector 's2' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›
1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.
Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
RFC 8301
MediumSelector 'smtpapi' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›
1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.
Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
RFC 8301
MediumSelector 'default' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›
1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.
Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
RFC 8301
MediumSelector 'mail' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›
1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.
Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
RFC 8301
LowNo explicit subdomain policy (sp=)›
Subdomains inherit p=, which is usually what you want. Setting 'sp=reject' explicitly protects unused subdomains even while the parent is still at p=none.
Consider adding 'sp=reject' if no subdomain sends mail.
LowNo MTA-STS policy›
Without MTA-STS, mail to your domain can be downgraded to plaintext by an active network attacker, because SMTP's STARTTLS is opportunistic by default.
Publish a TXT record at _mta-sts.intuit.com and a policy file at https://mta-sts.intuit.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.
RFC 8461
LowNo TLS-RPT record›
Sending servers have no address to report TLS failures on mail to your domain, so transport problems stay invisible to you until someone complains.
Publish 'v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:<address>' at _smtp._tls.intuit.com.
RFC 8460
InfoEligible for BIMI›
Your DMARC policy is already enforcing, which is the hard prerequisite for BIMI. Publishing a logo is now largely a branding exercise.
Publish an SVG Tiny PS logo plus a VMC, then add a default._bimi record.
InfoZone is not signed with DNSSEC›
This is the common case and not a misconfiguration -- most working mail domains are unsigned. It is worth knowing because your authentication records are only as trustworthy as the DNS answers carrying them, and because DNSSEC is the prerequisite for DANE.
If your DNS provider supports one-click DNSSEC, enabling it is low risk. If it does not, this is not worth changing providers over.
RFC 4033
Show 19 passing checks
PassAggregate reporting is configured›
Aggregate reports are requested at: [email protected].
PassExternal report destination emaildefense.proofpoint.com is correctly authorised›
Authorised by intuit.com._report._dmarc.emaildefense.proofpoint.com
PassExternal report destination emaildefense.proofpoint.com is correctly authorised›
Authorised by intuit.com._report._dmarc.emaildefense.proofpoint.com
PassDMARC policy is p=reject›
Mail failing authentication is rejected outright. This is the correct end state.
PassSPF ends in '-all' (hard fail)›
Unauthorised hosts are explicitly rejected. This is the correct end state.
PassAdobe Marketo's DKIM key is published at m1._domainkey›
Detected via SPF include:mktomail.com. A valid public key for this service is published at m1._domainkey.intuit.com.
PassZendesk's DKIM keys are published at zendesk1._domainkey, zendesk2._domainkey›
Detected via SPF include:mail.zendesk.com (nested). A valid public key for this service is published at zendesk1._domainkey.intuit.com, zendesk2._domainkey.intuit.com.
Pass17 DKIM key(s) published›
Found at: default, email, google, k1, k2, k3, m1, mail, mandrill, mte1, mte2, s1, s2, s3, smtpapi, zendesk1, zendesk2.
PassSelector 'zendesk1' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 'zendesk2' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 'google' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 'k2' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 'k3' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 'mte1' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 'mte2' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 's1' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 'email' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 's3' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassCertificate issuance is restricted by CAA›
Only amazon.com, comodoca.com, digicert.com, globalsign.com, letsencrypt.org, pki.goog, sectigo.com may issue certificates for this domain, so a certificate for your mail hosts or your MTA-STS policy endpoint from any other authority would be a mis-issuance.
RFC 8659
Transport and zone
Where your mail lands, and whether the DNS carrying your records can be trusted.
This is the configuration. It is not the whole picture.
A DNS scan cannot tell you whether intuit.com’s mail actually aligns, because alignment is decided per message at the receiver. Collect DMARC aggregate reports to see every source sending as this domain.