ibm.com
Receivers are told to reject mail that fails authentication for this domain.
Receivers are told to reject mail that fails authentication for this domain. Keep watching aggregate reports so a new sending service does not silently start failing.
Score held up: DMARC is enforcing at p=reject, so nobody else can send as this domain. That is the hard part, and it is done. What is left below is about your own mail arriving, not about anyone spoofing you.
130 DNS queries · 1267 ms
- 1Selector 'm1' uses a 1024-bit RSA keyRotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
- 2Selector 'm1' uses a 1024-bit RSA keyRotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
- 3Selector 'email' uses a 1024-bit RSA keyRotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
- 4No CAA recordPublish a CAA record naming your certificate authority, for example: 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
Identity ·Sending services detected
Read from your SPF includes and MX hosts, then checked for a published DKIM key.
Identity ·DMARC
- Policy
- reject
- Coverage
- 100%
- Alignment
- dkim=r spf=r
Identity ·DKIM
111 selectors probed
k2MailchimpRSA 2048k3MailchimpRSA 2048s1SendGridRSA 2048s2SendGridRSA 2048pm1PostmarkRSA 2048pm2PostmarkRSA 2048zendesk1ZendeskRSA 2048zendesk2ZendeskRSA 2048m1MarketoRSA 1024m1MarketoRSA 1024dkimGenericRSA 2048emailGenericRSA 1024s3GenericRSA 2048Identity ·SPF
Worst-case evaluation across every include.
Findings (8)
MediumSelector 'm1' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›
1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.
Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
RFC 8301
MediumSelector 'm1' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›
1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.
Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
RFC 8301
MediumSelector 'email' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›
1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.
Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
RFC 8301
LowNo MTA-STS policy›
Without MTA-STS, mail to your domain can be downgraded to plaintext by an active network attacker, because SMTP's STARTTLS is opportunistic by default.
Publish a TXT record at _mta-sts.ibm.com and a policy file at https://mta-sts.ibm.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.
RFC 8461
LowNo TLS-RPT record›
Sending servers have no address to report TLS failures on mail to your domain, so transport problems stay invisible to you until someone complains.
Publish 'v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:<address>' at _smtp._tls.ibm.com.
RFC 8460
LowNo CAA record›
Any certificate authority in the world may issue a certificate for this domain. A mis-issued certificate can be used to intercept mail on the wire and to impersonate your domain over HTTPS.
Publish a CAA record naming your certificate authority, for example: 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
InfoEligible for BIMI›
Your DMARC policy is already enforcing, which is the hard prerequisite for BIMI. Publishing a logo is now largely a branding exercise.
Publish an SVG Tiny PS logo plus a VMC, then add a default._bimi record.
InfoZone is not signed with DNSSEC›
This is the common case and not a misconfiguration -- most working mail domains are unsigned. It is worth knowing because your authentication records are only as trustworthy as the DNS answers carrying them, and because DNSSEC is the prerequisite for DANE.
If your DNS provider supports one-click DNSSEC, enabling it is low risk. If it does not, this is not worth changing providers over.
RFC 4033
Show 17 passing checks
PassAggregate reporting is configured›
Aggregate reports are requested at: [email protected].
PassExternal report destination emaildefense.proofpoint.com is correctly authorised›
Authorised by ibm.com._report._dmarc.emaildefense.proofpoint.com
PassExternal report destination emaildefense.proofpoint.com is correctly authorised›
Authorised by ibm.com._report._dmarc.emaildefense.proofpoint.com
PassDMARC policy is p=reject›
Mail failing authentication is rejected outright. This is the correct end state.
PassSPF lookup count is healthy (1/10)›
Worst-case evaluation stays within the limit with headroom to spare.
PassSPF ends in '-all' (hard fail)›
Unauthorised hosts are explicitly rejected. This is the correct end state.
Pass13 DKIM key(s) published›
Found at: dkim, email, k2, k3, m1, pm1, pm2, s1, s2, s3, zendesk1, zendesk2.
PassSelector 'k2' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 'k3' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 's1' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 's2' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 'pm1' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 'pm2' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 'zendesk1' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 'zendesk2' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 'dkim' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
PassSelector 's3' uses a 2048-bit RSA key›
Key length meets current guidance.
Transport and zone
Where your mail lands, and whether the DNS carrying your records can be trusted.
This is the configuration. It is not the whole picture.
A DNS scan cannot tell you whether ibm.com’s mail actually aligns, because alignment is decided per message at the receiver. Collect DMARC aggregate reports to see every source sending as this domain.