amazon.com
Receivers are told to send to spam mail that fails authentication for this domain.
Forged mail is being filtered to spam rather than rejected, or the policy applies to only a share of messages. Most of the protection is there; the last step is not.
Score held up: DMARC is enforcing at p=quarantine, so nobody else can send as this domain. That is the hard part, and it is done. What is left below is about your own mail arriving, not about anyone spoofing you.
130 DNS queries · 380 ms
- 1Selector 'm1' uses a 1024-bit RSA keyRotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
- 2No CAA recordPublish a CAA record naming your certificate authority, for example: 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
- 3Selector 'zendesk1' is revokedDelete the record once no mail in flight still references it.
- 4Selector 'zendesk2' is revokedDelete the record once no mail in flight still references it.
Identity ·Sending services detected
Read from your SPF includes and MX hosts, then checked for a published DKIM key.
Identity ·DMARC
- Policy
- quarantine
- Coverage
- 100%
- Alignment
- dkim=r spf=r
Identity ·DKIM
111 selectors probed
zendesk1Zendeskrevokedzendesk2Zendeskrevokedm1MarketoRSA 1024Identity ·SPF
Worst-case evaluation across every include.
- include:spf1.amazon.com
- include:spf2.amazon.com
- include:spf3.amazon.com
- include:amazonses.com
Findings (10)
MediumDMARC policy is p=quarantine›
Failing mail is delivered to spam rather than rejected. A meaningful improvement over none, but spoofed mail still reaches the recipient's mailbox.
Move to p=reject once reports show no legitimate mail failing.
MediumSelector 'm1' uses a 1024-bit RSA key›
1024-bit is the RFC 8301 floor, not a good target. 2048-bit is the current recommendation and is universally supported.
Rotate to 2048-bit at your next key rotation.
RFC 8301
LowNo explicit subdomain policy (sp=)›
Subdomains inherit p=, which is usually what you want. Setting 'sp=reject' explicitly protects unused subdomains even while the parent is still at p=none.
Consider adding 'sp=reject' if no subdomain sends mail.
LowSelector 'zendesk1' is revoked›
The record has an empty p= tag, which RFC 6376 defines as revocation. Harmless if intentional, but stale revoked selectors are worth cleaning up.
Delete the record once no mail in flight still references it.
LowSelector 'zendesk2' is revoked›
The record has an empty p= tag, which RFC 6376 defines as revocation. Harmless if intentional, but stale revoked selectors are worth cleaning up.
Delete the record once no mail in flight still references it.
LowNo MTA-STS policy›
Without MTA-STS, mail to your domain can be downgraded to plaintext by an active network attacker, because SMTP's STARTTLS is opportunistic by default.
Publish a TXT record at _mta-sts.amazon.com and a policy file at https://mta-sts.amazon.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.
RFC 8461
LowNo TLS-RPT record›
Sending servers have no address to report TLS failures on mail to your domain, so transport problems stay invisible to you until someone complains.
Publish 'v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:<address>' at _smtp._tls.amazon.com.
RFC 8460
LowNo CAA record›
Any certificate authority in the world may issue a certificate for this domain. A mis-issued certificate can be used to intercept mail on the wire and to impersonate your domain over HTTPS.
Publish a CAA record naming your certificate authority, for example: 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
InfoAmazon SES uses selectors we cannot discover›
Detected via SPF include:amazonses.com. SES generates a random per-identity selector when Easy DKIM is enabled, so it cannot be discovered from DNS. Check the SES console for your selector. We cannot confirm or rule out DKIM signing for this service from DNS alone.
Add your Amazon SES selector so we can verify it on every scan.
InfoZone is not signed with DNSSEC›
This is the common case and not a misconfiguration -- most working mail domains are unsigned. It is worth knowing because your authentication records are only as trustworthy as the DNS answers carrying them, and because DNSSEC is the prerequisite for DANE.
If your DNS provider supports one-click DNSSEC, enabling it is low risk. If it does not, this is not worth changing providers over.
RFC 4033
Show 5 passing checks
PassAggregate reporting is configured›
Aggregate reports are requested at: [email protected].
PassSPF lookup count is healthy (4/10)›
Worst-case evaluation stays within the limit with headroom to spare.
PassSPF ends in '-all' (hard fail)›
Unauthorised hosts are explicitly rejected. This is the correct end state.
Pass1 DKIM key(s) published›
Found at: m1.
PassBIMI is published with a certificate reference›
The record at default._bimi.amazon.com names a logo and a Verified Mark Certificate (a=), and DMARC is enforcing, which BIMI requires. We read the record only; the logo and certificate themselves were not fetched or checked.
Transport and zone
Where your mail lands, and whether the DNS carrying your records can be trusted.
This is the configuration. It is not the whole picture.
A DNS scan cannot tell you whether amazon.com’s mail actually aligns, because alignment is decided per message at the receiver. Collect DMARC aggregate reports to see every source sending as this domain.